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1.    Introduction and Research Question 
 
Professional teamsports proposes a unique opportunity to test empirically some 
predictions that have emerged in labor market theory. Although firm data is very desirable 
to analyze these conjectures it is – at least in Europe- difficult to obtain relevant data. As a 
result the economist has to ask where and how to procure “functional equivalent” data 
that makes an inspection of the theories feasible. Indeed, there is hardly any other field 
setting where data is more transparent and obtainable than the professional sport. We 
know the name, face, age, team and career-history for every worker in this industry. In 
addition, compensation packages and performance indicators for each individual are 
widely available.
1 
In the current paper we focus on the examination of three established modern labor market 
theories: The human capital model, the matching hypothesis and Lazear’s delayed 
compensation design. All of them have in common that they identify a climbing concave 
relationship between a worker’s wage rate and his productivity while tenure and/or career-
length increase. On the one hand this positive correlation is widely regarded as intuitive, 
because it is reasonable that workers will earn higher wages as tenure at a particular job 
increases. On the other hand it is considered enigmatic due to the three theories different 
implications. Using data from two out of four US Major Team Sports Leagues, the 
“National Basketball Association” (NBA) and the “National Hockey League” (NHL), we 
should be able to investigate the three theories empirically and reduce at least some to the 
unclear implications so far.  
However, the latter aspect is thought to be analyzed in a later step, because the paper is 
not ready developed yet to answer that fundamental question. So far we will first present 
the mentioned theories and display some descriptive results from the two available 
databases. We will then proceed with some estimation to provide further analysis of the 
connection between players’ tenure and earnings. Before turning to the theoretical part let 
us first bridge the gap between the field of sports and economics. 
                                                          
1 This does not hold for the German Soccer-Bundesliga. Although it is possible to trace performance 
figures, teams’ policy terms on player contracts are not disclosed.   
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2.    Business and the US-Teamsportindustry 
 
More than 40 years ago, Simon Rottenberg (1956) wrote the first economic analysis of 
labor markets in professional sports, paving the way for most subsequent work. Since 
then, the sporting world has changed a fair bit and also removed from Baron Pierre 
Coubertin’s motto  “le plus important est de participer”. Today sport has become a big 
business, with players salaries, franchise values and merchandising gaining in magnitude 
from season to season. 
Sport however, is only one, but increasing part of the entertainment service among others 
like the music or movie industry.
2 Television is the  driving force behind the explosive 
scope of these activities in recent decades. An event like the NFL Super Bowl or the 
Baseball World Series match attracts a remarkably large audience all over the world.
3  The 
“Big Four”- Major League Baseball, the NBA, the NFL and NHL get about half of their 
revenues from broadcasting. TV revenues collapsed in the early 90s when CBS took a 
$500 and ESPN a $150 million loss. So there were a major restructuring in 1993 with 
lower revenue opportunities and fewer guarantees of revenue from TV. Later in the 90s, 
Fox network upped the bidding in an attempt to use sports as a springboard into the 
network big time (ABC, NBC, and CBS). Recently the NFL signed an 8-year contract 
worth $17.6 billion with several networks. This yield $74 million per year per team, by far 
the best deal on pro sports. The NBA gets about $800 million per year for the next six 
years, averaging $30 million per year for each team. Baseball TV revenues were hurt by 
the strike in the 90s but appear to be bouncing back. The deal is worth $14 million on 
average per team for the 99/00 season. For hockey, television is less profitable than for the 
other leagues due to the league’s focus in Canada. It only pays the teams on average $5 
million per year.  
Broader media considerations are not the only rich source of revenue team income. 
Endorsements and product licensing are very responsible for the enormous prosperity of 
                                                          
2  See Franck (1995), pp. 7.  
3  More than 130 million Americans sat around to watch the 1999 Super Bowl, more the 700 million 
worldwide. Advertisers paid an average of $1.6 million for 30 seconds of commercial time during the 
broadcast.  
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the professional teamsport as well. The NBA pioneered the concept of marketing and 
merchandising units in the mid 90. Last season the NBA made $1.6 billion in licensed 
products -caps, shirts, cards, toys and computer games, anything with a sports logo on it. 
But everyone else caught on fast. By the end of the 1990s, pro football led the pack with 
retail sales of NFL-licensed goods totaling $3.6 billion. Concerning merchandising the 
NHL did better than in acquiring TV revenues. Past season the NHL sold licensed gear 
worth $980 million. 
Team values did also increase significantly over the past years. Was the average NBA 
franchise worth $70 million in 1991 it more than doubled in these days ($183). Out of the 
29 NBA teams the New York Knicks are valued the most with $334 million. NHL teams 
did even better. In 1991 the average icehockey franchise accounted for $44 million 
whereas it was valued $135 million in 1999. The New York Rangers topped the ranking 
being worth $236 million whereas the Carolina Hurricanes closed the ranking with an 
estimated worth of $70 million. Franchises are most expensive in the NFL. The average 
value of the 29 teams is $376 million. The Dallas Cowboys cost $663 million while the 
cheapest NFL team (the Detroit Lions) is worth $293 million.
4  
According to Forbes Magazine the 118 major league teams are essentially owned by the 
richest people in the U.S.
5 Microsoft billionaire Paul Allen who has a fortune of $40 billion 
owns the Seattle Seahawks (NFL) and the Portland Trailblazers (NBA). And then there’s 
i.e. Ted Leonsis, the master marketer at AOL, who paid $85 million for the Washington 
Capitals (NHL) has a fortune of almost $700 million.
6 
7 
Most people are aware of escalating player salaries. The average baseball salary in 1970 
was $29,000. Today it is $2.4 million. In 1990 the NBA paid it’s 325 players on average 
$920,000
8 but it is $2.9 million today. Players like Shaquille O’Neal, Kevin Garnett,   
Alonzo Mourning earn in excess of $15 million a season. Today there are 80 NBA players 
                                                          
4  In early 1999, a Maryland businessman and a New York investment banker offered $800 million for the 
NFL’s Washington Redkins franchise. 
5  Forbes Magazine December 1999, pp. 99. 
6  Internet pioneer Mark Cuban, co-founder of Broadcast.com, purchased the Dallas Mavericks (NBA) in 
January 2000 from Ross Perot Jr. for approximately $280 million. Cuban is worth $1.2 billion. 
7  Wealth data comes from (http://www.forbes.com). 
8   See Franck, E. (1995), pp. 13. 
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earning more than $5 million. In fact, O’Neal just re-signed with the Los Angeles Lakers 
paying him $350 million until 2006. But with so much money to put toward “Superstars”, 
marginal players are often compensated less than $1 million a season. Hockey’s financial 
landscape has also changed dramatically. The average NHL salary this season (1999/2000) 
is $1.3 million, compared with $271,000 at the beginning of the decade. Pittsburgh 
Penguins forward Jaromir Jagr signed a long-term contract that will pay him $48 million 
over six years and there are 25 players earning in excess of $5 million. 
 
3.    Competing Labor Market Theories 
 
After having presented the North American teamsport-industry we can now turn to 
investigate the three rival labor market hypothesis. In this paper we examine age-earnings 
profiles, that is the growth of wages with work experience and/or  tenure. The three 
theories are the human capital model, the matching hypothesis and seniority pay. They all 
manifest this relationship but use different approaches in explaining the presence of this 
positive correlation. However, before starting to analyze the upward sloping age-earnings 
profile generated by the standard human capital theory, let us briefly illustrate the aspects 
of an investment in human capital.   
 
3.1.  Human Capital Theory 
3.1.1.  Investment in Human Capital 
 
The idea of the human capital model is derived from capital theory and was formulated as 
early as 1776 by Adam Smith and extended in the work of Milton Friedman and Simon 
Kuznetz in 1945. Basically, capital theory defines an investment as an initial cost that one 
hopes to recoup over some period of time. Similarly to that token is the formulation of the 
human capital model: Individuals make most of their investments in themselves when they 
are young and to a large extent by foregoing current earnings. Gary Becker (1962, 1964) 
Jacob Mincer (1958, 1962, 1974) and Theodore Schulz (1960, 1961) significantly 
developed the theory and analyzed if the expected net present value of an individual’s  
  6  
 
earnings generated by an investment in education exceeds it’s initiatory start-up costs. 
Only in the case of a positive output the investment in human capital is profitable. 
Determining the exact outcome of an investment in education however, includes a cost-
benefit calculation by the investor. On the one hand the investor faces near term 
expenditures in form of directs costs, which contain tuition, and books. Additionally, there 
are opportunity costs, because during the investment period it is usually impossible to 
work. On the other hand the investment in a person’s own education (skills) is supposed 
to enhance the individual’s future productivity and consequently alters positively life cycle 
earnings. Calculating the returns on investment over time requires the progressive 
discounting of returns lying further into the future. Discounting future benefits is a 
necessary condition, because rewards that are perceived in the future are valued less than 
an equal sum of returns received today. The intuition behind that logic is straightforward: 
Individuals are prone to think myopically and favor to consume their benefits earlier than 
later. Moreover, if these additional earnings are invested rather than consumed, interest on 
the investment can be deserved which enlarges the investor’s wealth.  
Having introduced two inevitable consequences of the investment in human capital we can 
now explore the-for this paper- more relevant connection between wages and productivity 
regarding the human capital model. 
 
3.1.2.  General Human Capital 
The most important type of human capital investment takes place on „on-the-job-training„. 
According to Becker (1975) it is necessary to distinguish between two types of on-the-
job-training, because these two types have different implications for workers income and 
productivity, but provide a novel explanation for that observation.  They are “general” on-
the-job-training (GOJT) and “(firm) specific” on-the-job-training (SOJT). The former type 
of training (GOJT) indicates in it’s simplest form that workers are paid wages equal to 
their marginal revenue product. Marginal revenue product rises because productivity 
increases. Increasing productivity result from workers’ investments in „on-the-job general 
training„. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between wage (W), productivity (V) and the 
time profile (t): Wage and productivity ascent at  the same rate but with diminishing  
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returns. The worker’s income is depressed at early years, but rises over time as investment 
declines and as returns on past investment are realized.  
 








The main characteristic of the general human capital model is it’s transferability: Skills 
acquired in general training are fully portable from firm to firm. Air-Force pilots i.e. suit 
this type of human capital. Cruising a Jumbo or a C5 is of minor difference except that the 
C5 is significantly larger. Since the training is general, it is not wise for the firm to pay for 
this acquisition. Workers who have invested in GOJT will be offered more lucrative 
compensation packages by firms, which do not have to regain the full return on 
investment. Facing this threat from competing companies, firms will either not supply any 
general training at all or they will induce workers to pay for it by accepting lower wages 
than they would receive otherwise. To keep its’  working force the original firm is 
constantly forced to match the workers wage with his increasing productivity. This is the 
explanation why the worker’s earning profile is coupled with a low starting wage but 
raises with diminishing returns later in life. 
 
3.1.3. Firm Specific Human Capital 
The second explanation for the upward-sloping age-earnings profile in the human capital 
story is firm specific on-the job training (SOJT). Firm specific on-the-job training differs in  
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many aspects from the general on-the-job training. In contrast to the GOJT, firm specific 
on-the-job training is not movable from one firm to another. It is only productive in the 
firm were it is obtained from, but worthless in any other. As a result other firms cannot 
pirate workers’ SOJT. Figure 2 displays the worker’s age-earnings profile in the firm 
specific model. Since the skills are firm specific, the remuneration that the training firm can 
offer beat that which any other firm can offer (on average over time). This does not imply 
that the firm is willing to finance all the training, in return for which it would expect to 
receive the entire difference between productivity and the outside wage that the worker 
could get. 
  










This is an advantage for the worker because he is now in a situation to blackmail the firm 
by telling to quit. In this case the firm would lose its investment, but the worker is 
indifferent between working at the current firm or working outside (Wo) because his wage 
would -on average- be the same.  
Turning the argument up side down does not improve the situation: If the worker carries 
the full cost of training, he wants to reap all benefits, which makes the firm indifferent 
between hiring the able, but highly paid worker and hiring the unskilled, less well-paid 
worker. Now the worker is coming short, because the company can threat to dismiss him 
W 
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unless he accepts a depressed salary. This menace is by all means a credible commitment 
because the firm can simply fire the worker and substitute him. The solution to this 
dilemma is to split the costs as well as benefits. Since the firm needs to waive some of the 
profit from investing in the worker, it can ask him to bear some of the costs. Since the 
worker knows that the firm will be able to force him to accept a wage less than his 
productivity when he is skilled, he can ask the firm to carry some of the costs. 
Consequently, as demonstrated in figure 2, firm specific on the job training is co-financed 
by both parties. Productivity (V) is below the worker’s wage (Wi), which means that the 
employer takes some of the investment costs. On the other side the worker earns less than 
he could earn outside (Wo), until (t1), which indicates his willingness to pay for the 
training. The parties do also divide the benefits. The shared benefits implicate that both 
worker and firm are induced to stay together. The firm profits most from keeping this 
special employee and both groups would suffer from separation. Once the investment has 
been finished (t1) the worker enjoys more gains in his current firm (Wi) than outside (Wo), 
which does also overcompensate him for his initial investment and makes him reluctant to 
leave the firm. The firm makes money on its employee because his productivity (marginal 
revenue product) (V) after (t1) is higher than the salary paid. Summarizing, in the firm 
specific human capital investment model are wages below and rise more slowly with 
diminishing returns than marginal revenue productivity. 
 
3.2. Matching Theory 
 
Human capital theory has offered a clear explanation for rising wage profiles with 
experience. An alternative point of view for the presence of this correlation is given by 
Jovanovic (1979). He argues that the match between worker and firm is crucial for the 
observation of upward-sloping concave wage profiles. More specifically, the matching 
hypothesis emphasizes that wages and tenure are high because efficient matches between 
worker and firm will last, while  non-productive matches will separate. The major 
assumption in Jovanovic’s theory is the level of imperfect information between employee 
and employer at the outset of their labor relationship. This means, that the outcome of  
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their relationship is uncertain and cannot be controlled for ex-ante. Although the firm can 
use certificates and collect some other information (experience, reputation) on it’s future 
worker it cannot completely be sure how he will actually turn out. Both the firm and the 
worker treat each other as a search good and assess the other party’s correct quality. It is 
further assumed that both the firm and the worker have reservation wages. Figure 3 shows 
the workers most likely setup wage (Ws). Both parties have to meet “somewhere” that 
suits their wage ideas at the beginning of the employment: The firm is not willing to 
compensate an outside worker above a certain level given certain characteristics and the 
worker will not accept less than a certain pay level given characteristics on the job. 
 








As tenure however increases (t1) the firm gains additional information about the worker. 
After time, both parties learn from each other and it is now easier to estimate the worker’s 
real skills. This does hold for the worker as well, who now has a much better sketch over 
the job than at the beginning. This accumulation of information decides about the duration 
of the relationship. Negative information will separate the parties and the worker’s income 
is downward (Wnp), because he was not productive enough. Conversely, positive 
information regarding valuable for both sides generate the upward based wage profile 
(Wp), because the match is productive and creates profits. Summing up, matching theory 
suggests that good matches are more efficient and end in longer tenure and higher wages. 
Wp 
Wnp  
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3.3. Efficiency-Wage Theory 
 
Literature provides a third variant that constructs an explanation for rising concave wage 
profiles. This theory is Lazear’s (1981) delayed compensation model. According to this 
theory are individuals undercompensated when they are young but are encouraged to 
work hard in order to stay with the firm and collect their due compensation when they are 
old.
9  Since Ross (1973), Stiglitz (1974,1975), Mirrlees (1976) and Holmström (1979)
10 
we know that workers are agents of the owner and that their interests are not the same. 
Workers prefer to slow back labor (shirking) while their wage remains constant and 
owners favor workers who put forth effort in order to enhance productivity. Facing this 
conflict of interests it is necessary to establish a compensation system that aligns both 
parties divergent interests.
11 Efficiency wages perform such a job because they reduce the 
incentive for the worker to shirk. In Lazear’s terms the latter aspect is causal for the 
observation of an upward-based age-earnings profile.  
In Lazear’s model the worker’s wage does  not correspond to his marginal revenue 
product even if controlled for tenure. Figure 4 shows that a worker is indifferent between 
a wage path which offers him his spot wage (V) at each point in time and one which pays 
him less than his marginal product initially and more than his marginal product at the end 
of his working career (W).
12 However, this is only then true, if the present value of the 
total upward-sloping wage (W) and the total constant productivity (V) over time (T) is 
equal. Lazear further assumes that the owner penalizes shirking by the employee in form 
of lay-offs. As suggested above, if other things are equal, workers are indifferent between 
the two paths. Other things are  not equal, however. If shirking results in immediate 
dismissal the rising wage line creates increasingly higher costs with longer tenure. In other 
words, the larger the future amount of income for the worker approaching the end of his 
worklife, the greater the money he forfeits while caught slacking. Figure 4 also exhibit the 
worker’s reservation wage profile (Aw), which indicates his second best job opportunity. 
                                                          
9   Lazear (1981); pp. 606. 
10  These are all economists representing the “Normative Agency-Theory” 
11  For an extensive formal derivation of Holmström’s principal-agent solution see Prinz (1999). 
12  Lazear (1981); pp. 607.  
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In order to choose the firm with the steep wage profile the alternative pay may not exceed 
the seniority pay profile and the slope must also be flatter, because otherwise the worker 
would not have selected the steeper wage shape. Figure 6 displays the worker’s 
opportunity cost if he shirks at point t* and gets fired.  
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Shirking costs the worker the shaded area in figure 6, which is the difference between the 
steep career salary path (W) and the alternative wage (Aw) at shirking time (t*). Due to the 
mechanism of the rising wage profile, the worker has an incentive not to reduce his effort 
and remains with the firm, because otherwise he looses his secured high future income if 
he slacks-off. The worker will not reap the fruits of his labor. 
Firms may also deviate from the contract. Moral hazard on behalf of the firm occurs as 
premature contract termination at the break-even-point (t2). In an unrealistic case where 
no information passes from senior to junior workers, it is profitable for the firm to cut 
their contracts at (t2), because workers marginal revenue product between time t1 and t2 is 
higher than their wage (costs of the firm). The difference between (V) and (W) at t1 and t2 
is called the “lay-off gain” for the firm. It saves while not paying the worker his true 
compensation after the break-even-point. However, older workers tell their younger 
mates, if the firm violated contract terms in the past. Hence, defaulting is expensive for the 
firm because it’s reputation capital is at stake. Honest firms do not have to worry about 
that. Firms that disregarded the rules in the past, however, must offer a flatter wage profile 
with the purpose to acquire employees for the next period. Flattening the wage shape 
signals a credible commitment from the firm to potential workers not to behave 
opportunistically and fulfill the contract, because firm incentives to shirk are lessen. 
Despite that advantage for the firm to recoup its trustworthiness the flatter wage line 
implements less incentives for workers to intensify effort, which rises the likelihood of 
shirking. To avoid this disadvantage the firm needs in order to survive in the long haul 
credibility and behave honestly. 
In order to decide which of the determined theories above are relevant, they are now 
translated to the subsequent set of hypothesis of empirical testing.
13 Testing for the general 
human capital model we posit the following:   
 
Hypothesis 1: The greater workers’ (players’) investment in human capital the better their 
performance. 
                                                          
13  Hint:  Since the paper is not readily developed yet we ignore the matching-hypothesis.   
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This assumption must be tested against the null hypothesis that while players age their 
productivity might decrease. 
Analyzing for Lazear’s seniority incentive mechanism we presume: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The longer the worker (player) remains with his current team the higher his 
wage, while productivity stays constant.  
 
4.   Data, Models and Empirical Findings 
 
We will use longitudinal (panel) data to test empirically the above mentioned hypotheses. 
The NBA data set is hand-collected and is drawn from two primary sources, the Sporting 
News Register and the Sporting News Guide. It consists of all players that appeared in at 
least one regular season game in any of the NBA-seasons 1993/1994-1999/2000. The total 
number of observations is about 3200, with some players being active in all 7 seasons and 
others in only one oft them.
14 While single performance figures (games played, minutes, 
field goals, free throws, three points, rebounds, assists, blocks, turnovers, steals and 
individual characteristics -which is essential for this analysis- (career duration, tenure,) are 
available for athletes
15, this is not the case for player salaries and contract duration. The 
former information is missing for approximately 2% of the population, the latter for about 
36%. Complete player information in the NBA is readily available for 2071 “player years” 
(64%). 
The NHL data is taken from various books of the Official Guide & Record Hockey Book 
covering all players that appeared on ice in any of the NHL seasons 1996/1997-1999/2000 
with the exception of the goaltenders.
16 We will explore the performance and salaries of 
exactly 946 different hockey players out of 2960 valuable cases. Productivity statistics 
(goals, assists, total points, games played and penalties) are procurable for all the cases, 
                                                          
14  These are either rookie players (no NBA experience) who just entered the league or veteran players 
who play their last season. 
15   There are 738 different players for the whole seven years of NBA investigation. 
16   Goalies must be analyzed separately, because they are a different population of players. 
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but the database lacks information on the “draft” and “salary” variable. The erstwhile is 
absent for 7% and the last mentioned for one percent. Most important for the hypotheses, 
we have a transparent survey about every player’s experience in the NHL and their 
respective years with one and the same team (tenure). Unfortunately, contract duration is 
not attainable in ice hockey, but other variables that might be of interest like the age and 
the weight of a hockey player is included. The final NHL data set contains 2763 useful 
“player years”. All performance data for NBA and NHL are for regular season play. 
Table 1 and Table 2 illustrate NBA and NHL players’ summary statistics of the most 
important variables needed later on. 
 
Table1: Descriptive Statistics of NBA  Players for the 1993/1994-1999/2000 seasons. 
 
Player Characteristics  Mean  Std Dev 
Career Length (CL); Experience  6,1  3,96 
Years with Current Team; Tenure (YCT)  2,42  2,20 
All Star Games (ASG)  0,46  1,56 
Draft Number (DN)  32,84  32,66 
Player Statistics (Performance measure)   
Minutes per game(MPG)  20,21  10,87 
Scoring Performance per Minute(SP)  0,56  0,25 
Non-Scoring Performance per Minute (NSP)  133,12  177,60 
Contract Characteristics   
Annual Salary (in US$)  1.785.000   
Contract Duration (CD) in years  3,62  2,40  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of  NHL  Players for the 1996/1997-1999/2000 
seasons. 
 
Player Characteristics  Mean  Std Dev 
Career Length; Experience (CL)  7,1  4,2 
Years with Current Team; Tenure (YCT)  3  2,56 
All Star Games (ASG)  0,55  1,85 
Height in cm  186  5 
Weight in kg  92  6,54 
Age  28  4,3 
Draft Number (DN)  66  65,1 
Player Statistics (Performance Measure)   
Goals per Game (GPG)  0,14  0,131 
Assists per Game (APG)  0,23  0,171 
Games Played (GP)  51  26 
Penalties in Minutes (PIM)  46  47,3 
Contract Characteristics   
Annual Salary (in US$)  1.050.000   
 
 
Most of the variables above are used in both data sets. Career length and tenure are 
already explained above and mean that the NBA athlete plays on average 6 years in the 
league and stays on average 2.4 years with his current team. The All Star Game variable 
indicates how many times a player participated in an exhibition game where the  best  
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players from the west compete against the best players from the east once a year. The 
draft mechanism is conducted at the end of the season and is a very important institution in 
all major-league sports. It is the principal device for the franchises to secure new talent or 
rebuild after a losing season. The rules of the draft dictate the order in which professional 
teams get to select amateur college teamsport players. The team with the worst win-loss 
record of the past season has the highest probability of picking the most talented college 
player in the “draft-lottery”.  The rest of the teams in the league then elect players in the 
inverse order of their prior regular season records, with the best team picking last in each 
round. Hence, the draft lottery enforces competitive balance in the league and leads to 
relatively equal playing strength between league members and holds the competition 
“entertaining”. 
The primary variable representing offensive NBA ability is the Scoring-Performance 
variable and measures a player’s direct points. We use Harder’s (1992) composite measure 
of defensive performance and team attributes by applying the Non-Scoring-Performance 
variable.
17  
Some icehockey variables differ from NBA variables. Player characteristics indicate that 
hockey men stay on average one year longer in their business than basketballers and prefer 
to remain farther with their present club than the sportsmen from the NBA. Goals and 
assists are the players’ measure for direct productivity whereas penalty in minutes captures 
a hockey player’s intensity of play and defensive skill. As noted in Jones and Walsh 
(1988), a more intense skater demonstrates a willingness to make the sacrifices required 
for the team’s success. Hockey is a though sport and players need strength to be effective. 
In order to control for various physical attributes that may affect player performance, and 
that are not recorded by other performance variables, measures for a player’s height and 
weight are included. Ceteris paribus, stronger players may be more effective offensively 
and defensively as they can use their size to gain strategic position during the game.
18 
                                                          
17   NSP is computed using the following formula: rebounds+assists+blocks+steals - (field goals attempted 
-  field goals made) - (free throws attempted - free throws made)/minutes. 
18   Another variable that represents a player’s offensive and defensive skill is the plus/minus statistic. The    
plus/minus statistic is calculated by assigning a player a plus 1 if he is on the ice when his team scores 
a full-strength goal, and assigning him a minus 1 if he is on ice and his team gives up a full-strength 
goal. However, plus/minus statistics are not readily available for players in all seasons, hence we need  
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As can be seen from a comparison of above tables NBA players earn on average 
significantly more than their hockey mates, there is however, a little bias in the hockey 
data because goalies are excluded which on average earn more than skaters. 
Perhaps a plain look can already signal us something about NBA and NHL players’ salary 
paths and their corresponding productivity. Figure 7 and 8 display NBA players’ effect on 
income and scoring performance (SP) while experience and tenure rise. This and the 
following charts do all have US$ values as a common denominator. In other words, 
productivity is expressed in dollars in order to compare both curves.   
 
Figure 7: Authentic Wage/Productivity Path with Experience for NBA players. 
 
Figure 8: Authentic Wage/Productivity Path with Tenure for NBA players.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
to drop that important information. 
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Both figures demonstrate that wages increase either with experience or tenure. Obviously, 
staying with one and the same team is more valuable from the outset than rising 
experience. In the wage-experience figure, players’ are four years “undercompensated“ 
before break-even, while in the tenure model players’ already “earn“ money in their second 
year.  
A closer look at the performance profile indicates that productivity (SP) in figure 7 is 
downward-sloped. This however,  contradicts our first hypothesis, because the more 
players’ invest in “on-the job-training“ the lower their productivity. This is not the same in 
the tenure model (figure 8), where performance hikes the longer a basketball player 
remains with his current team. Due to this it is -so far- more likely that the general human 
capital model is not applicable for offensive players. The firm-specific human capital model 
seems to be more relevant in this matter. In order to test if offensive NBA players do 
really not enhance their productivity while aging, but play better while getting older and 
stay with their actual club we develop the following model specification: 
 
(1) SP = a1CL + a2CL
2 + a3YCT + a4YCT
2 + a5DN +a6 ASG + e 
  
The human capital model suggests that performance rise with more on-the-job-training. 
Our model uses direct productivity (SP) as dependent variable whereas career length and 
in particular tenure are our main regressors in an ordinary least-square estimation. 
Moreover, we apply on the right hand side a player’s physical talent and control further for 
all-star status. The latter two independent variables are therefore essential, because one 
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could imagine that the pure player talent -expressed by DN and ASG- could themselves be 
responsible for higher performance. If our descriptive evidence above is correct we should 
verify the null hypothesis with regard to the experience (CL) coefficient, but should 
observe a positive correlation between tenure and productivity. The inclusion of the 
squared terms in above and the following equations captures both, the positive effect of 
experience –if then any- and the negative impact of aging and controls additionally for 
non-linearity.  
Estimates of equation (1) are reported in Table 3. Most striking, our model rejects the 
forecasted hypothesis that performance rises with more experience: The coefficient of the 
experience variable is negatively sloped saying that productivity sinks the longer a player is 
in the league. Attention however must be paid to the fact, that performance accurately 
declines, when the player is little past the „experience-peak“ (see Table 1 and Figure 7 that 
on average a player stays 6 years in the league). Hence, the decrease gains in magnitude as 
the player ages, which is not leveled-off by the gain in experience for offensive-skills. 
While this indicates to refuse the general human capital model, it invites to adapt the firm-
specific human capital pattern. The tenure coefficient is significant at the 1% level telling 
that players who remains 1.5 years longer with the current team than the average player 
stays with his former team (average = 2.4 years), produces 8 % more direct points. 
 
Table 3: The Impact of Experience and Tenure with Regard to (SP) Productivity 
 
Variable  B  T 
CL  - 0,00000075  - 0,04+ 
CL
2  - 0,000083  - 3,37*** 
YCT  0,0276    4,81*** 
YCT
2  0,00231  - 4,32*** 
DN  - 0,00098  - 7,27*** 
ASG  0,0516  14,10*** 
Intercept  0,59  41,56*** 
R
2  12,2   
F-Value  74,6   
N of Cases  2071   
 
+  n.s.; *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01  
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Since this result is somehow surprising we will now investigate the effects of experience 
and tenure regarding a player’s teamwork attributes. Figure 9 demonstrates that it takes a 
much longer time for a player who invested in team contributing skills (assists, blocks, 
steals and rebounds) to reap any benefits. In the first four years does the team earn money 
on the player and then pays him a salary which equals his marginal revenue product. Since 
the average career length is six years, most of these basketballers are only paid what they 
are worth. Conversely to their offensive teammates, productivity slopes upward when 
controlled for experience. This is in line with our first hypothesis and does also indicate 
that cooperation is a long learning process. 
 













Figure 10: Authentic Wage/ Non-Scoring Productivity Path with Tenure for NBA 
players.  






























To test empirically the general human capital model we apply the same equation as above 
but substitute direct performance with teamwork contributing skills (NSP). 
 
(2) NSP = a1CL + a2CL
2 + a3YCT + a4YCT
2 + a5DN +a6 ASG + e 
 
 
Table 4 presents results for the relationship between experience and tenure on the one 
hand and team attributing performance on the other. Diagnostic tests for this estimation 
report that no statistical assumptions were violated in our analyses. Consistent with 
hypothesis 1, the results show that teamwork productivity promotes, while players’ age 
and remain longer with their current team. All independent parameters influence 
productivity in the predicted manner, that is, these coefficients have the sign as anticipated 
and are statistically significant. 
 
Table 4: The Impact of Experience and Tenure with regard to (NSP) Productivity 
 
Variable  B  T 
CL  12,5   4,87*** 
CL
2  - 0,91                -  5,41*** 
YCT  35,91    9,11*** 
YCT
2  - 2,77  - 7,55*** 
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DN  - 058  - 6,29*** 
ASG  27,44   10,92*** 
Intercept  48,44    4,95*** 
R
2  12,0   
F-Value  73,1   
N of Cases  2071   
 
+  n.s.; *p < .10; **p < .05; *** p < .01 
 
Thus, considering players’ teamwork abilities, we are prone to adapt the general human 
capital model. Since specification (1) failed to explain general human capital, but showed 
some good evidence for team-specific human capital there is a “tie” with respect to the 
explanation of Basketball players’ age-earnings profile. Fortunately, we are in the position 
to re-run the estimation with our second database from the National Hockey League.   
Figure 11 and 12 demonstrate hockey players’ earnings and productivity paths. While 
skaters wages rise -similar than basketball players’- hockey players’ quality of play does 
also improve with experience, which was not the case for offensive players in the NBA. In 
order to distinguish between the general and firm-specific human capital model we install 
the hockey data in above model specification: The dependent variable uses total points per 
game
19 (Tppg) and measures players’ productivity. Explanatory parameters remain the 
same. 










                                                          
19   Total points are the sum of goals plus assists. We do not distinguish between offensive, defensive or             
teamwork performance. 























  24  
 
 
Figure 12: Wage and Productivity Slopes with Tenure  
 
(3) Tppg = a1CL + a2CL
2 + a3YCT + a4YCT
2 + a5DN +a6 ASG + e 
 
Table 5 supports conjecture 1 and the descriptive evidence atop. Earnings are strongly 
upward based after break-even. The coefficient for experience is positively significant as 
well as the tenure coefficient, even when controlled for talent and stardom: Although one 
can think of hockey being a fierce and rough sport, players have on average a longer 
career than basketball players do. The hockey model is more robust than either the 
offensive or the team attributing performance NBA model. More than 24% of the 
variation in player productivity is explained by the independent variables, according to the 
adjusted-R
2 obtained from the regression. This is twice as much than the NBA 
productivity estimations. Allover, results for hypothesis 1 are mixed but tend to confirm 
the general human capital model.   
 
Table 5: NHL Players’ Productivity Determinants 
 
Variable  B  T 
CL  0,043  10,54*** 
CL
2  - 0,0026               - 11,08*** 
YCT  0,0352    7,11*** 
YCT
2  - 0,0024  - 5,97*** 
DN  - 0,00033  - 4,70*** 
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ASG  0,071   22,30*** 
Intercept  ,841   12,55*** 
R
2  24,5   
F-Value  122   
N of Cases  2763   
 







Since productivity seems to be correlated with tenure in all empirical tests, we do still lack 
evidence on efficiency theory. Theoretically, the efficiency wage is a salary that deters 
cheating, because it exceeds the opportunity wage by an incentive compatible amount. The 
wage is set higher than market-clearing wages in order to motivate the employee to work 
more efficiently. By paying an efficiency wage, the company establishes a financial reward 
for honest behavior from its employees, and so discourage them from shirking.
20 Under 
hypothesis 2 we should observe workers wages’ travelling north while tenure and 
experience rise even under the control of various productivity and stardom parameters. 
 
To run the test we use the data described above and distinguish between three NBA 
regression models. Design (1) is the standard Mincer-type wage equation that tries to 
identify player salary determinants. Special attention is paid to tenure and experience but 
performance measures are included as well. In model (2) we add a variable that measures 
the length of the individual player’s contract (CD). This variable is important because it 
incorporates extra information on player salary determinants: The greatest incentive to 
shirk exists in the period directly following the signing of the new contract, which has the 
least bearing on future income.
21 Conversely, a player might put forth effort in the final 
year of his running contract. The logic behind this variable is that a player who will 
                                                          
20   Milgrom, P.; Roberts, J. (1992). 
21   Maxcy, J. (1997).  
  26  
 
become a free agent
22 at the end of a season may play with greater effort and intensity than 
they might otherwise, with the purpose to impress potential employers. Following this 
reasoning we expect a positive coefficient for this variable. Pattern (3) extends model (2). 
Firstly, a dummy variable measuring a team change is added and, second, an interaction 
term (team change times contract length) is included into the specification. If the new team 
is less informed about a player’s abilities and motivation than his old team, a team change 
should c.p. lead to an income reduction. It should be straightforward from the remarks just 
made that individuals salary act as dependent variable whereas regressors feature to 
explain the variance in players’ salaries. Since investments in OJT are recorded in units of 
time-years and other explanatory variables in units of games, the dependent variable -
earnings- is expressed in logarithms. The empirical semi-log models testing hypothesis 2 
are formulated as follows: 
 
(1)   ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3CL + a4CL2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2 
             + a7MPG + a8SP + a9NSP + X´TD + X´YD + e 
 
(2)   ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3CL + a4CL2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2 
             + a7MPG + a8SP + a9NSP + a10CD + X´TD + X´YD + e 
 
(3)   ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3CL + a4CL2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2            
    + a7MPG + a8SP + a9NSP + a10CD + a11TC + a12CL*TC  
              + X´TD + X´YD + e 
 
with  ln(Y):  log of annual salary 
  DN:  draft number 
                                                          
22  There are two types of free agency. Restricted and unrestricted. An unrestricted free agent is free to 
sign with any other team, and there’s nothing the player’s original team can do about it. Restricted free 
agency gives the player’s original team the right to match an offer sheet the player signs with any 
other team and keep the player.  
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  ASG:  number of all-star games 
  CL:  years as a professional 
  YCT:  years with current team 
  MPG:  minutes per game 
  SP:  scoring performance 
  NSP:  non-scoring performance 
  CD:  contract duration 
  TC:  new contract signed with new team (0=no; 1=yes) 
  X’ TD:  each model is estimated with team-dummies 
  X’YD:  each model is estimated with year-dummies 
  e:  random error term 
 
where   an = parameters to be estimated 
Since we have a model with an endogenously determined right hand side variable -because 
contract duration and salary are determined simultaneously- the latter two models are 
estimated by an instrumental variables approach (2SLS), while model (1) is estimated 
using ordinary least squares (OLS).  
 
Let us now turn to the results. Estimates of equation 1-3 are reported in Table 6. We find 
a good deal of evidence that support hypothesis 2: Both predictor parameters are 
significant at the one- percent level and are sloped upwards. The tenure coefficient i.e. in 
model 1 indicates that staying 3 years with his current team instead of the average 2.4 
years increase a player’s salary c.p. more than 15%. Furthermore, playing 8 instead of the 
average 6 years in the league let c.p. wages grow more than 22%. Since these results are 
in accordance with our predicted hypothesis 2 it should be emphasized, that these findings 
are even then highly positive significant, when controlled for performance statistics.  
For example a player who scores 1,0 point per minute instead of the average 0,56 direct 
points (SP) earns c.p.15,4% more than the average performing athlete. Likewise, a player 
competing 25 minutes per game on the field instead of the average 20 minutes has a 20% 
higher income. The same is happening with the draft variable. If our expectation is correct, 
a lower draft pick indicates better talent and players should be compensated more. Hence 
estimates of a1 should be negative. The coefficient of the draft variable indicates that being  
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picked at 15
th instead of 33
rd (average) pays-off in an 18% higher salary. Similarly, all-star 
players who demonstrate unusual skills that attract fans should earn greater salaries, all 
else equal. The all-star coefficient displays that a player who has one standard deviation 
more all star games than the average player c.p. earns 12% more money.  
 
Model (2) displays that the coefficients estimated in model (1) suffer from an "omitted 
variable bias": Especially our coefficients of the experience and tenure variables are 
significantly reduced (by about 60% and 50% respectively) once the length of the contract 
is controlled for. Moreover, contract length has a significantly positive influence on player 
salaries. Signing a four- instead of a three-year contract (3,6 years is the average) goes 
hand in hand with a 25%-increase in annual earnings. 
Table 6: The Determinants of Player Salaries in the NBA (1993/94-1999/2000). 
 
Variable  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
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TC  - 
 
-  -0,775 
(-11,21)*** 
TC*CD  - 
 
-  0,174 
(4,37)*** 






Adj. R2 * 100  62,6  73,1  74,1 
F-Value  76,9  121,1  293,6 
N of Cases  2.071  2.071  2.071 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; + n.s. (t-values in brackets). 




Our last NBA model shows that the influence of contract length on player salaries differs 
significantly between players who remain with their “old” team and the ones who switch 
teams. While stayers enjoy a 15%-increase in earnings with every additional year of 
contract length, movers suffer a 77%-decrease.
23  
 
Our second database from the NHL also qualifies to test Lazear’s seniority approach. If 
                                                          
23   At first hand this income reduction seems unreasonable large. One aspect is the new club’s 
information deficit with respect to the recent acquired player. Hence, the new club is only willing to 
pay a wage that is less than he received with his old franchise. In other words this is partly what 
matching theory suggests. However, there is a second aspect, the so-called “salary-cap”. The salary cap 
is the maximum dollar amount teams can spend on player contracts. A salary cap is also necessary to 
maintain competitive balance in the league. Without a salary cap, teams with deeper pockets can 
simply outspend the remaining teams for the better free agents. The basic idea is that a team can only 
sign a free agent if the total salaries for the team will be below the salary cap. So a team with deep 
pockets is playing on a level playing field with every other team. To avoid that salary cap restriction 
teams try to circumvent that obstacle and sign movers by just paying them very little in their first year 
of new-contracting, but annual income growth heavily in the following years of new-contracting. Thus, 
that effect might take place in the model and must be tested next for. Nevertheless, the income 
reduction that follows a team change is likely to be a mixture of asymmetric information and escaping 
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hypothesis 2 is correct we should observe positive parameters for NHL experience and 
tenure. In order to investigate for this we apply the subsequent multiple regressions: 
 
(1) ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3CL + a4CL2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2 
+ a7Height + a8Weight +a9GP +a10GPG + a11APG +a12PIM +X’TD+X´YD 
+ e 
 
(2) ln(Y) = a0 + a1DN + a2ASG + a3CL + a4CL2 + a5YCT + a6YCT2 
+a7Height +a8Weight +a9GP +a10GPG +a11APG +a12PIM +a13TC 
X’TD+X´YD + e 
 
 
The variables Height and Weight are included on the grounds that certain physical 
attributes, such as reach and strength, allow the player to accomplish more on the ice. 
Thus, Height and Weight may proxy “all-round” quality of play that is not otherwise 
captured by the model. We anticipate a positive relationship between physical size and 
salary up to some optimal height and weight and therefore negative correlations for 
squared terms.  
 
Estimates of NHL equations 1 and 2 are reported in Table 7. Looking now at the basic 
specification in column (1) we see that all independent variables have the predicted signs 
and each is statistically significant, with the exception of player Height and PIM. The 
career length coefficient says that a player who manages to stay one year longer in the 
league than the average 7 years earns, all else equal 10% more. Analogously, a player 
staying two years longer with his original team makes c.p. 10,4% more money than the 
player who quits his current team after 3 years. Similar to the experience variable (CL) 
might (GP) be interpreted.
24 It’s coefficient is weaker than the experience and tenure 
coefficient but still highly significant. We anticipate that skill increases with the number of  
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games played and this should be reflected in salary. The (GP) coefficient of 0,00095 says 
that a player who is 70 instead of the average 51 games on ice earns, all the same $20,000 
more. Most strongly positive correlated to wages are players’ abilities. Making i.e. one 
standard deviation more assists than average skaters pays-off in a 23% higher salary. This 
underlines hockey’s importance of cooperation. Also a player’s strength (Weight) is an 
element in the hockey salary determination process:
25 A 100 kilogram “tank” is 
compensated 8,7% more than his average lighter coworker.
26  
Results for NHL regression 2 is given in column 2 of Table 7. In this model we add a team 
change variable (TC) in order to test if players’ income is reduced after switching teams. 
Table 7: The Determinants of Player Salaries in the NHL (1996/97-1999/2000). 
 
Variable  Model (1)  Model (2) 
































                                                                                                                                                                          
24   Recall from page 15 that (GP) is the amount of games a skater played. PIM are the Penalties. 
25   It is obvious that a player’s height in the NBA is essential but not incorporated in our NBA regression 
It is predicted here, that larger NBA players will c.p. earn higher wages, because it is part of a player’s 
natural talent, which should affect his productivity. 
26   We also experimented a combined Height * Weight variable representing a player’s “Total-Mass”, but 
we did not find it to be significant. 
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Adj. R2 * 100  56,8  58,0 
F-Value  288  298 
N of Cases  2.763  2.763 
*p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01;  + n.s. (t-values in brackets). 
 
 
The hockey data verifies our results from the NBA. The (TC) coefficient has the correct 
slope and is significant at the 10% level telling that hockey players suffer an income 
decrease when moving to another team.
27 Unlike professional basketball the institutional 
environment for salaries in the NHL is open. Hockey has no salary cap but our result is 
significant negative hinting evidence that asymmetric information plays a big role. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion and Implications for Further Research 
 
This paper  has attempted to draw out the positive relationship between tenure/ job-
experience and rising wages. The problem is that three different modern labor market 
approaches can be used to explain this correlation and we tried to find out which one is 
the most appropriate. Our specific empirical focus has been on professional basketball and 
hockey because data is readily available to analyze the three theories. We were able to 
                                                          
27   If we run the regression with GOALS and ASSISTS instead of GPG and APG, the TC coefficient is  
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investigate the human capital model and found out that more investments in general on-the 
job training improves a worker’s productivity significantly, even when controlled for 
talent. Furthermore, we were able to test for seniority compensation: Descriptive evidence 
as well as numerous multiple regressions from both databases implied that players’ are 
paid greater wages when they are old than when they are young even under the inclusion 
of performance parameters. This efficiency wage model needs some more investigation: 
The next step to be taken in this aspect is to find players with the same job assignment 
(position) and the same average productivity (performance) and test if older players tend 
to be paid more than younger players.
28  
Many aspects of the underlying question however remain. As said in the beginning, the 
paper is far from being  fully developed. Since we could only show the relationship 
between the amount of investment in human capital to the worker’s productivity we 
weren’t successful in showing that this results in upward-sloping earnings. Regarding this 
aspect the next step to be taken is to distinguish between general and team specific human 
capital for both sports. We need to investigate if “movers” do really perform poorer with a 
new team than with their old club and thus are rewarded less. In order to do this, we need 
to separate the player population and look where single athletes travel. So far, we did not 
take full advantage of our longitudinal data sets: Both provide an opportunity to use more 
complex and efficient estimation techniques than applied yet. Two frameworks advance 
the classical regression model and take advantage of the nature of the data: The fixed- 
effects model and the random-effects model. The advantage of these models is that each 
allows for estimation of the heterogeneity across groups and each eliminates the problem 
of omitted variables.
29 More precisely, the fact that we face data considering  n  units 
(players) over T time (years) periods were we have income and other characteristics of 
these n (players) surveyed each of T (years), this cross-sectional time-series dataset must 
take account for that. Moreover, attention must be paid to the fact that some players are 
only paid minimum wages which strongly recommends the use of a random-effects tobit 
                                                                                                                                                                          
not significant but has the negative sign. 
28   We just calculated players’ actual age for each observation. 
 
29    See Kahn (1993a).  
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model, since the salary variable is consequently left-censored.  
There is another major empirical challenge: The matching hypothesis, which we 
introduced in the theoretical part of this article, was not empirically tested. Doing this 
won’t be easy, but Chapman and Southwick (1991), Ohkusa and Othake (1996) and 
Prisinzano (2000) apply a model that uses a Cobb-Douglas function, which seems to be 
suggestive.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 